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Non-technical Summary
Vertical integration of electricity distribution network operator and electricity supplier is a key issue in European energy markets, in particular since the European Commission (EC) has initiated a sector inquiry in 2005. The EC argues that vertical separation of electricity networks from other activities (such as production and retail) increases consumer surplus, while opponents argue that vertical integration enables cost savings due to economies of scope. The European Competition Commission too indicates the disadvantage of vertical integration in energy markets for retail customers caused by potential discrimination of competitors. Aiming at preventing non-price discrimination the EC suggests alternative regulatory approaches to overcome the challenge of vertical integration. Legal unbundling, as an intermediate approach between ownership unbundling and vertical integration, describes a particular type of separation. In this case, the regulation requires legal separation of a grid unit from the retail/production and the operation of the grid by independent management.
In a theoretical model we show that vertically integrated incumbents in the electricity market might have an incentive to favor their own downstream unit over competitors. We distinguish between demand decreasing and cost increasing non-price discrimination. Delaying supplierswitching or withholding important information from competitors are examples for such types of non-price discrimination. This discriminatory behavior might affect the retail prices. Therefore, consumers might be worse off if the distribution network operator and the downstream retail incumbent remain vertically integrated. We further consider the effects that arise from introducing legal unbundling as already implemented in several European Countries. In line with other studies, the results show the legal unbundling regime to be favorable if it works perfectly, i.e. can indeed prevent non-price discrimination.
To test our hypotheses derived from the theoretical model we employ cross-sectional data for geographically separated submarkets for household customers in Germany, each served by one distribution network operator, one downstream retail incumbent and a number of small energy providers. As the vertical structure is heterogeneous across the 850 German electricity submarkets for residential customers (there exist legally unbundled, vertically integrated or fully separated firms), we use firm level data to analyze the effects of different vertical structures and regulation schemes on retail electricity prices. We find significantly higher prices in markets with vertically integrated firms compared to markets with fully separated firms. This finding could indicate non-price discrimination. Furthermore, we find no evidence that legal unbundling eliminates the incentives for non-price discrimination because the prices do not differ from prices in markets under vertical integration. Therefore, we suggest implementing stricter rules for sufficient legal unbundling to prevent potential discrimination against competitors.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze (Summary in German)
Im Gutachten der Europäischen Kommission (2005) input costs, non-price discrimination ("sabotage") might influence quality, customer preferences, cost, and, finally, the demand. To prevent price discrimination upstream price regulation can be installed, but non-price discrimination remains an issue. In general, such non-price discrimination is legally prohibited, but can hardly be detected by the regulation authority (Economides, 1998; Beard et al., 2001 ).
The literature on non-price discrimination distinguishes between alternative approaches, e.g.
raising rivals' costs, in case of information asymmetry, or reducing rivals' quality. Vickers (1995) analyses welfare effects of a vertically integrated upstream monopolist who provides price regulated upstream services and simultaneously acts in the retail market. Furthermore, he assumes the regulator to be imperfectly informed about upstream costs. This fact allows the monopolist to select a wholesale price from a set of prices. Vickers shows that due to information asymmetry, upstream regulation cannot completely prevent discrimination incentives. Sappington (2006) Mandy and Sappington (2006) consider an alternative approach of non-price discrimination with an upstream provider able to influence not only competitor's costs, but also demand, by reducing the product quality. The authors show that both cost-increasing discrimination and quality-reducing discrimination are profitable under Cournot competition. However, only cost-increasing discrimination is profitable under Bertrand competition. Our theoretical model, which we use to derive our hypotheses, is related to Mandy and Sappington (2006) .
Similarly we analyze the effects of cost-increasing and demand-reducing non-price discrimination, and, in contrast, we consider a Hotelling game because we firmly believe the total market demand in energy markets for household customers to be price inelastic in a short run. Furthermore, we believe that the customers' choice on energy supplier depends not only on the energy price, but also on firm preference.
Aiming at preventing non-price discrimination the European Commission suggests alternative regulatory approaches to overcome the challenge of vertical integration. Legal unbundling, as an intermediate approach between ownership unbundling and vertical integration, describes a particular type of separation. Hereby, the regulation requires legal separation of grid unit from the retail/production and the operation of the network by de jure independent grid unit management. Cremer et al. (2006) and Bolle and Breitmoser (2006) show that the stronger unbundling is enforced by law, the more network operators try to benefit from higher distribution charges, whereas downstream competition is reduced resulting in higher retail prices. In contrast, Höffler and Kranz (2011a) 
I. The German Electricity Sector
The electricity sector can be subdivided in five interrelated stages: Generation, wholesale, transmission, distribution and retail. In Germany, four electricity producers, EnBW, E.on, 7 Transmission networks are the highest voltage lines that are used for long distance transmission whereas distribution grid is a regional network to supply end consumers. E.g. Steiner (2001) and Hattori & Tsuitsui (2001) investigate the effects of unbundling the transmission grid. Copenhagen Economics (2005) estimated the unbundling effects on prices and productivity for 15 European countries (in 1990-2003) finding that unbundling transmission from generation leads to lower prices and higher productivities. 8 Nillesen and Pollitt (2008) Germany. The remaining territory, which stretches from Northern Germany to Bavaria, belongs to E.ON. Thus, incumbents' still have high market share after the liberalization.
II. Unbundling experience from other countries
New Zealand is the first country that has implemented ownership separation of electricity distribution from other commercial activities. The separation, introduced in 1998 after electricity market restructuring in 1992, resulted in no significant retail price reductions. Nillesen and Pollitt (2008) analyze New Zealand's economic effects of unbundling, employing a dataset between 1995 and 2007. They show that prices for commercial customers decreased, whereas residential electricity prices increased after the unbundling intervention.
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Furthermore, unbundling caused a strong reduction in the number of competitors as energy producers acquired retailers. In their consideration of the unbundling effect on production and distribution costs, the authors find significant operational cost reductions. However, these
were not passed on to customers in terms of lower distribution charges.
Currently, the Netherlands is politically debating the ownership separation on the distribution level, which has been legally implemented since 2011. Nooij and Baarsma (2008) summarize the arguments stated in the literature that ownership separation positively affects competition.
Among others, they show in a scenario analysis of the Dutch electricity sector that discriminatory activities and cross-subsidization of vertically related companies could appear.
In contrast to this theory-based analysis, Mulder et al. (2005) find only a little evidence for a 7 price effect due to vertical separation with a broad cross-country analysis of vertical integration strategies.
III. Theoretical Model
With a simple theoretical model, we aim at illustrating the effects arising from non-price discrimination in different vertical structure settings on the downstream prices and derive hypotheses for our empirical analysis. We do not seek the non-price discrimination equilibrium in the theoretical model but rather analyze the incentives to sabotage the competitors and the impact on retail prices. We compare alternative types of non-price discrimination with alternative forms of vertical regulation.
Consider a Hotelling game with uniformly distributed potential customers and two firms located at either end of a line. 11 Firms offer electricity contracts with a given amount of electricity demand per contract. It is reasonable to assume that firms compete with differentiated contracts as, at least in Germany, the electricity price is not the only factor on which consumers decide. Consumers' preference for a particular firm (brand) is also crucial.
Furthermore, we assume that the incumbent, located at 0, is vertically integrated with the distribution system operator (DSO). The DSO provides a common input, "access" to the distribution grid at a cost-based regulated per-unit price b , the distribution charge. The DSO faces constant per unit costs , if the customer buys from the incumbent () (1 ), otherwise.
(1) 11 We assume the market demand to be highly price-inelastic in the short run.
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Because the distribution charge is regulated, the DSO could be interested in favoring its downstream unit over its competitor by engaging in non-price discriminating activities. We distinguish between two approaches which are cost-increasing, c s , and demand reducing, d s , form of discrimination. Cost-increasing discrimination can appear due to delays in (important) information provision e.g. on consumers' energy consumption, whereas demand-reducing discrimination is e.g. due to delays in the contract switching process. While cost-increasing discrimination directly increases the entrant's unit costs, demand-decreasing 'investments' simultaneously increase the preference for the incumbent but decrease the preference for the entrant, 0
Discrimination induces costs ( , )
cd C s s to the DSO with increasing rate,
As usual in Hotelling models, the demand split is defined by the marginal consumer i x who is indifferent between the incumbent's contract and the competitor's contract. Thus, we get the incumbent's demand Ii Dx  as: 
We assume a two stage game where, first, the vertically integrated incumbent chooses the discrimination strategy ( , ) cd S S s s  and, second, downstream their prices simultaneously.
Vertical integration
We begin with vertical integration and the assumption that the incumbent maximizes the total profit of both units, that is max( )
. By backward induction, we get the best reply functions:
Cost-increasing discrimination increases the entrant's price, ' ( As cost-increasing discrimination forces the competitor to choose a higher price than without discrimination, the competitor loses a fraction of the customers. As a result, these customers turn to the incumbent. That allows the incumbent to charge a higher price. 
. This inequality holds for
In contrast to cost-increasing discrimination, the effects of demand-decreasing discrimination are ambiguous and depend on additional assumptions.
We assume that the firms have the same unit costs, de cc  , i.e. they pay the same price for electricity at the wholesale level, and the impact of demand-decreasing discrimination on the competitor's transportation costs is larger than the impact on the incumbent's transportation costs,
. With these additional assumptions, the incumbent's price increases with demand-decreasing discrimination (Lemma 2 (i)).
In the following we first discus the exclusive effects of both discrimination types. According to Lemma 1 cost-increasing discrimination is profitable for the incumbent as this action increases both the incumbent's price and also its demand. However, taking into account the impact on the incumbent's network operator, cost-increasing discrimination decreases the competitor's quantity and raises operator's costs. As a consequence, the incumbent reaches We know from Lemma 1 that the level of cost-increasing discrimination also affects the profitability of demand-decreasing discrimination and, therefore, we have to consider the joint outcome in the next step. The previous findings, ( The discussion in line with Proposition 1 provides theoretical evidence that incumbent's price is always lower without non-price discrimination. Therefore, given our assumptions, the upstream firm has incentives to engage in non-price discrimination, which always results in a higher price than without any discrimination. In contrast, the competitor's price choice depends on the magnitude of demand-decreasing discrimination and customers' loyalty, i.e.
the transportation costs.
Fully separated firms
We consider the outcome in the event of total separation as this is our reference structure for the hypotheses. Given our assumptions, the equilibrium outcome is straightforward: In case of total (full) separation the DSO has no incentives to discriminate. As each firm in our setting maximizes its own profits, the profit of the DSO is maximized without engaging in non-price discrimination, because discrimination is costly and market demand is constant,
Therefore, downstream prices are not affected by discrimination because the DSO does not take into account the discrimination effects on downstream profits.
Hypothesis 1: In markets with vertically integrated firms, non-price discrimination results in higher retail prices of the incumbent compared to markets with fully (ownership) separated firms.

Legal unbundling
We adopt the ideas of Cremer et al. (2006) and Höffler and Kranz (2011a) and assume that the legally unbundled grid operator considers (or is forced to consider) only its grid activity and maximizes only the upstream profit,
whereas the downstream incumbent maximizes total profit, upstream and downstream. With perfect legal unbundling the total profit is given by:
Given our assumptions, the grid operator earns the same profit independently of downstream market shares because the total market demand is constant and distribution charges are regulated. Therefore, discrimination only negatively affects the DSO's profit and -with perfect legal unbundling -the grid operator has no incentive to discriminate. This outcome is in line with the findings of Höffler and Kranz (2011a) .
We check whether the partial consideration of grid profits affects the retail providers' profit maximization strategies. Deriving the incumbent's optimum retail price strategy brings us to
Proposition 2: With perfect legal unbundling, the grid operator maximizes its upstream profit with the equilibrium strategy (0, 0) S  . Therefore, the implementation of legal unbundling provides no incentive for non-price discrimination, in case it works perfectly.
Hypothesis 2: Perfect legal unbundling provides the same results as total separation (ownership unbundling). Therefore, incumbents' prices in markets with legal unbundling do not significantly differ from incumbents' prices in markets with total (ownership) separation.
Assuming that perfect legal unbundling eliminates the grid operator's legal relationship in the retail incumbent, the grid operator ignores the downstream effect of its strategic decisions, thus having no incentive to act in favor of its retail parent firm. However, according to the special report (Sondergutachten, 2009) 
of the German Monopolies Commission on issues in
German energy markets, the dependence of former vertically integrated operators remains strong even with legal unbundling. In particular, it is stated that upstream management decisions seem to be influenced by requirements of the retail incumbent. This might happen when the parent company is able to create an incentive-based relation to its affiliate. 13 To create such a relation, the retail incumbent needs sufficient ownership shares in the grid 
IV. Data Description
In the previous section we have shown that cost-increasing and demand-reducing non-price discrimination types are profitable from a theoretical point of view and, that they both increase the incumbent's electricity contract price. As sabotage is not observable (and difficult to detect by regulatory authorities), we are not able to test the theoretical model as such.
However, we are able to analyze price differences for electricity contracts in markets with different vertical structures, controlling for market and customer characteristics. Thus, price differences could indicate non-price discrimination, as discussed in the theoretical model.
Data Sources
We use data from multiple sources to cover the vertical ownership structure, retail prices, distribution charges and customer characteristics. Ownership information is provided by Creditreform, the largest German wholesale commercial credit agency. Price and contract information aggregated at the zip code level stems from the internet platform Verivox which collects information on electricity contract offers. Low-voltage grid information and gridrelated information is provided by E'net, the database for network characteristics. Aggregated information about customer characteristics are taken from the Acxiom database, which provides global information for marketing services.
We employ a cross-sectional approach using Data as of August 2008 that we aggregated at the distribution grid level. 15 Quantity and price data are selected for an average household consumption level of 4000 kWh per year (3 -4 persons).
Data Adjustments 16
The most comprehensive calculations concern the calculation of ownership shares. The
Creditreform database offers information about the ownership structure of each company in our sample. This information comprises both direct owners of the retail company and the grid into account in this study is the aspect of common owners on a higher level.
The grid access charge consists of a fixed part, the sum of a fixed usage charge and the meter charge, and a variable part which depends on the usage level. Thus, the grid access charge for a particular usage level is the sum of these components.
Our market definition is the same as suggested by the German Regulation Authority. Since incumbents' standard contract prices apply in the area where only one incumbent or DSO serves, we use that as the relevant market. Usually areas served by only one DSO are not identical with zip code areas -the level at which we have customer information. Therefore, we have first to aggregate the information at the grid area level. To do this we calculate weights using three-and four-person households for the aggregation of customer information to the grid level.
Data Description of the Key Variables
The descriptive information is summarized in Table 1 in the appendix. The information used in the estimations covers about 600 geographically separated electricity (relevant) markets.
In about 6 percent of all retail electricity markets in our sample network operators and retail incumbents are fully separated (ownership unbundling). In 16 percent, companies are legally unbundled. As there are also voluntary legal separations, we take the number of meter points as a proxy for the number of connected customers, thus, as a proxy for the threshold required for legal unbundling. Therefore, we can distinguish between required legal unbundling and 16 Because of the particular aggregation level of consideration, we have adjusted our data set to the market level instead of zip code level. 17 We appreciate inexhaustible support by our colleague Thorsten Doherr.
voluntary legal unbundling. 18 We consider the cases with partial ownership (for example with 70 percent share in DSO) as voluntarily separated, because partial ownership indicates that firms choose to hold stake in DSO without being obliged to separate their activities as they are not fully integrated. These firms might have more than 100,000 meter points (the threshold level for legal unbundling required by the German regulator). About 7 percent of the firms in our sample have more than 100,000 meter points, are legally unbundled but are fully owned by the parent company, so that they were obliged to separate the DSO (required legal unbundling). On the other hand, nearly 9 percent of the firms have voluntarily unbundled. These firms have either more or less customers than the threshold level. If they have more than the threshold, they are not fully owned by the incumbent. In 78 percent of markets, retail incumbents and distribution grid operators are one company, i.e. they are fully integrated and not legally separated. Thus, in these regions the standard contract provider has a strong information advantage over its competitors. It has knowledge of the quantities provided by competitors and, moreover, it knows exactly the customers served by its competitors. Note that we do not consider the ownership direction (who owns whom) because only in 3 cases out of 42, the DSO owns the retail incumbent. Therefore, we neglect the analyses of ownership direction in our estimates.
Turning to dependent variables, we find the standard contract price to be on average 44 Euros more expensive than the incumbent's lowest price offer. However, the lowest price offer of competitors which is comparable to the incumbent offers is on average more than 120 Euros cheaper than the standard contract. Taking into account pre-payment offers, the reduction is about 170 Euros for household customers. In line with the explanations in the Monitoring Report of the Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur), the distribution charge determines about 26.0 percent of the standard contract price in our sample.
V. Econometric Model
Due to missing information about company specific incentive schemes and internal information on vertical relations between the grid owner and the retail incumbent, we are unable to fully specify the explanatory equations. However, this latent information might have an effect on both the distribution charges and retail prices as described in the theoretical model. We therefore employ a simultaneous equation model, where the distribution charge enters the standard contract price equation, the incumbent's most competitive contract price equation, and the competitors' lowest price equation. Along with the standard contract price we also consider incumbents' competitive prices to count for effects caused by price discrimination and competitors' prices (the lowest market price) to capture the cross-prise effects. These are equilibrium prices. Ownership variables are used as explanatory variables for both the distribution charge equation and the price equations. We use the three stage least squares estimation method because we assume that the error terms correlate across the specified equations due to "shocks" that affect all endogenous variables.
We therefore end up with the following specification: 
 
We include control variables for grid characteristics and regional characteristics into the distribution charge equation, and control variables to characterize relevant markets in the price equations. Grid characteristics are proxied by grid area, the size of the distribution region, supply density (population divided by grid area) and population density. As some variables for grid characteristics are correlated, we consider only the number of meter points (correlated with grid area) and supply density in our estimations. Regional characteristics include information about customers such as total population and regional purchasing power.
For reasons of comparison, we employ alternative ownership measures and different specifications of the equations. First, we estimate the model including dummy variables for markets with fully separated, fully integrated and legally unbundled incumbents. In the case of legally unbundled firms, we distinguish between required and voluntary legal unbundling (specification A). Second, we take into account the number of competitors which have entered the markets (specification B) because we assume that the number of competitors, which is a proxy for competition intensity, has an impact on market prices. 19 Furthermore, we distinguish contracts with and without prepayments, i.e. contracts which have or have not to be completely paid in advance, and estimate our model twice including contracts without prepayment and contracts with prepayment as we assume both types of contracts to address alternative customer groups. As the results with regard to our hypotheses do not differ, we only report the results for contracts without prepayment.
There might be concerns about the endogeneity of ownership structure. For example, if the error term captures an important variable that influences the price setting of firms and at the same time this variable was the driving force for integration or voluntary separation.
However, the ownership structure, in particular the integration, of German incumbents are mostly the same as it was before market liberalization. Firms serving less than 100,000 customers were historically integrated and mostly remain integrated. For example, the number of business and industry customers in the area could influence the decision to integrate but do not necessarily affect the retail prices for household customers since these are different markets. The voluntary separation of incumbents with fewer customers than the threshold for the required separation occurred, as we presume, for reasons of taxation or simply for financial separation and regulation. Beside that some of the incumbents merge their network operators to take advantage of economies of scale. We control for that in our estimation by considering the grid characteristics.
VI. Estimation Results and Discussion
The estimation results are displayed in Table 2 in the appendix. In specification A, we examine the vertical structure ignoring the number of competitors in a market. In contrast, in specification B the number of competitors is taken into account. Full vertical integration is the reference category for the vertical structure dummy variables. However, observing these estimation results, it could be concluded that higher incumbent prices in vertical integrated markets indicate non-price discrimination.
Hypothesis 2 -lower incumbent prices in markets with perfectly working legal unbundlingmust be rejected because we find no evidence for legal unbundling to be favorable for integration -cannot be rejected because we do not observe any difference in prices between legal unbundling and vertical integration. However, the ownership share has no impact on pricing behavior. According to the theoretical results our empirical findings indicate that legal unbundling does not work perfectly. Therefore, the European Regulators need to force further legal unbundling and, besides the charge regulation, to be aware of possible non-price discrimination effects that arise from imperfect legal unbundling. In particular, we suggest 20 In specification B (estimation includes the number of competitors) the coefficient of ownership unbundling in our standard contract price equation is not significant at confidence interval of 95 %. However, the threshold of the p value to be significant at * p<0.1is just failed. Thus, we argue that the price for incumbent's standard contract is lower in markets with totally separated firms. The findings in specification A and the significance of the coefficient for ownership unbundling in the equation for incumbent's lowest price in specification B enforce our argument. 21 Although the lowest market price is significantly negative in voluntary legally unbundled markets, in specification B, the coefficient is negligibly small. In line with our previous study (Nikogosian and Veith, 2011) we find a significant impact of distribution charges on standard contract prices. The extension to the incumbent's low-price competitive contract and competitors' contracts shows also a significant impact of distribution charges on competitive prices. Comparing the size of distribution charges across the four high voltage zones, we find the highest distribution charges in the Vattenfall area in east Germany.
The significant deviation is mainly caused by higher depreciation rates due to network investments during the 1990s.
We find no significant effect of the number of ultimate owners-measure on prices and distribution charge. Considering the outcome for variables representing the demand side in submarkets, we find that lowest-priced-contract prices are higher in regions with a higher purchasing power. However, the effect is negligibly small. Furthermore, there is no significant effect on the standard contract price induced by purchasing power. In markets with a higher population higher price for standard contract are found. Also in this case the coefficient is close to zero.
As we also consider the number of competitors in distinct markets (in specification B), the results show a significant impact of the number of competitors on market prices. Surprisingly, the effects are opposite for the incumbents and competitors. That is, the competitors' prices for the lowest-priced-contract are negatively affected by the number of competitors, whereas the incumbents' prices increase with the number of competitors.
VII. Concluding Remarks
We consider the impact of vertical relations on retail and distribution prices in the German electricity sector. According to a recent research, price regulation of an input product in a option to prevent non-price discriminatory behavior. Such a regulation could be advantageous because it is less restrictive than ownership unbundling or total separation. However, we show that a lax implementation of legal unbundling can still provide incentives for non-price discrimination.
We test the findings of our theoretical model using firm level data for nearly 600 regional
German electricity markets for household customers. We find significant differences in the retail pricing behavior of incumbents based on alternative vertical ownership structures. In markets with fully separated incumbents (equal to ownership unbundling), retail prices for incumbents' contracts are lower than in markets with fully integrated incumbents.
Furthermore, we find no evidence for legal unbundling being the preferable regulatory instrument, because prices in markets with legally unbundled firms do not differ from prices in markets with vertically integrated firms. These results show that legal unbundling might not work perfectly because firms could circumvent the rules that ensure independence. To prevent non-price discrimination stricter regulation of legally unbundled incumbents can be implemented.
One shortcoming of our study is that we only focus on pricing aspects in our analysis. In particular, we do not consider any costs or investment aspects which have been brought forward in a range of theoretical articles. Nevertheless, our results provide empirical indications about the role of alternative forms of vertical unbundling regulation and their impact on downstream competition. 
Appendix A
